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On 2 September 1960, the State Department made a public announcement and a formal repudiation of a purported official US document which was being circulated in Latin America. The document was later published in Siempre, by Vincent Lombardo Toledano, well-known Mexican pro-Communist labor leader. The forgery is an alleged circular State Department airgram sent to all Latin American posts, 5 February 1960. The "airgram" discusses the Cuban call for a conference of under-developed nations and contains such statements as "the rapprochement between Cuba and the Asia-African states will complicate the implementation of the program set up to liquidate the Castro regime". Obvious errors which reveal the forgery include inter alia, the signature by Under-Secretary Dillon, who was not in Washington on 5 February, (the date assigned to the document), the serial number which corresponds to no actual series, the signature of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs which is given as Roy Rubottom whereas Mr. Rubottom signs all documents R. R. Rubottom, Jr., and the British spelling "defence" which is used for the word "defense". During 1957 and 1958, the Communists engaged in a systematic forgery campaign. Some twenty documents were issued between February 1957 and July 1958. Interestingly, seventeen of these twenty dealt with crisis situations in Near Eastern or Far Eastern nations similar to the Cuban crisis of today, e. g., the "Israeli-French General Staff War Plans", published in October 1957 and again in April 1958, the "Taipei Cables", published in September 1957, dealing with alleged US plans to unseat Sukarno in Indonesia, the "Loy Henderson Papers", published in May 1957, alleging an anti-Syrian plot. (See Addendum Sheet) These forgeries were cogently exposed in a series of articles by Roscoe Drummond, first published in August 1958 and reprinted in the Readers Digest of November 1958 (See Addendum Sheet). Since that time, the forgeries have fallen off. Recently, however, a fake British paper on African trade unions and a fake US Tokyo Embassy memorandum on U-2 flights have appeared in addition to this Cuban document (See Addendum Sheet). The Cuban document is apparently being widely circulated in Latin America by Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency dominated by Communists, and it represents precisely the kind of document prevalent in 1957-1958, i. e., a document designed to show the US attempting crass manipulation of the affairs of small nations.

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Party

The Cuban Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the Communist Party of Cuba, held a National Congress from 16 to 22 August 1960. The Congress was attended by at least sixty-five "fraternal" delegates from thirty-one Communist parties. These "fraternal" delegates were all high-level, and included, in addition to central committee representatives from other Latin American parties, such internationally prominent Communists as Jacques Duclos of France. The Communist PSP is the only party legally permitted to operate in Cuba. While Castro's "own party", the 26 July Movement, is apparently being neglected, the PSP develops cells, fronts and the other paraphernalia of a Communist party getting ready to take over a country completely. The Congress featured the expected violent attacks on the United States, unreserved praise for Castro, and pleas for unity among the forces backing the Cuban regime. PSP Secretary General Blas Roca in a twelve hour speech stressed the unity theme and called for the "coordination, cooperation, and fusion of all the conscious and radical Cuban revolutionary forces into a single revolutionary movement under the leadership of Fidel Castro." Jacques Duclos echoed this same theme and added, significantly, "it is important that the Cuban revolution represent for all the American nations the possibility of freeing themselves". General Wu Hsui-chan, Chicom central committee representative, also stressed the latter theme, praising Cuba for giving Latin America a "brilliant example" in the struggle for "emancipation from US domination". The Russians conspicuously sent no delegates. However, on 17 August, while the conference was in progress, Soviet Ambassador Sergey M. Kudryavstev and his staff of twelve officers arrived in Havana. (See Item 256, Bi-Weekly Guidance Issue #43). The PSP Congress took place concurrently with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, held in San Jose, Costa Rica. The world press paid major attention to the OAS meeting with only minimum mention of the PSP meeting. Within Cuba, the two meetings received equal play. Castro's speech on 23 August to a meeting of a new woman's front group - an obvious example of the "unity" approach stressed at the PSP Congress - did receive general attention. In this speech Castro specifically welcomed Soviet and Chicom aid, and it may be considered that this line grew out of the significant attention paid to the PSP Congress by the World Communist Movement.

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288. Yugoslavia and the Developing Areas

Yugoslavia is significant in the East-West struggle as an example (the only one to date) of an independent, national Communist state whose evolution up to this point gives reason to believe that it is reducing - though certainly not yet abandoning - the more virulent aspects of orthodox communism. Thus, in order to cope with changing world conditions, Yugoslavia has been forced to adapt - and, occasionally, actually revise - some basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Today, the ingenuity of Yugoslav scholars is being strained to the utmost to find theoretical justifications for economic and political practices which are dictated by contemporary necessity but which - partially or wholly - run counter to the theories of Marx and Lenin. In its economic program, Yugoslavia is turning, increasingly, to the precedents and experience of already-developed industrial societies: in other words, to the West. There is some basis for hoping that the adoption of certain Western economic practices together with their concomitant social orientations eventually might provide the right soil for the germination of Western political assumptions also. It is not their unorthodox and revisionistic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism that has earned the Yugoslavs the epithet "revisionist" (Khrushchev himself has repeatedly called for a "creative interpretation" of the Communist classics), but the fact that they instituted their program without prior coordination and approval by the Soviet Union.

Since its break with the Bloc in 1948, and, more particularly, during the last two years, Yugoslavia has made a serious effort to expand its ties with the developing countries of Africa, Asia and South America whose markets and soft-currency sources of raw materials were needed to guarantee Yugoslavia's economic independence following the suspension of Soviet aid. Yugoslavia was also motivated by political and prestige factors such as the hope of persuading these countries to join a loose association of neutralist nations in which Yugoslavia would be the leading element. These efforts were highlighted by Tito's tour of Afro-Asia and the visits of Afro-Asian leaders to Belgrade; by the dispatch of important Yugoslav missions to Latin America; by the extension of over 128 million dollars in credits to developing countries; and by intensive efforts to create a cultural, technical and economic community of interests with these countries. Belgrade has hoped to develop and lead an informal grouping of "positive neutralists" which would adopt a non-Bloc position on international issues. This objective was re-emphasized during the period of improved US-Soviet relations. To date, its efforts have centered on Asia (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, Iraq) and Africa (the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). Except for Cuba, Yugoslavia's relations with Latin America are still limited and aimed primarily at increasing trade and strengthening diplomatic ties.

Since Yugoslavia is not a member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and - alone or jointly with other "neutralists" - does not constitute a threat to the national security of the United States, but on the contrary is the embodiment of the Communist heresy, revisionism, the activities of Yugoslavia in general cannot be construed as hostile to United States interests. This acknowledgement, however, does not imply we should ignore certain negative aspects inherent in all forms of communism, such as the primacy of the state bureaucracy over the individual, the implicit authoritarianism of Leninist organizational principles,

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the addiction to police state methods and to subversion, the denigration of spiritual values, and, in general, the arbitrary and anti-democratic nature of Tito's regime.

Obviously, there are many concomitants of the Yugoslav program which, in an absolute sense, we should not wish to promulgate. However, in dealing with Yugoslav influence on the developing countries, we are concerned, in many cases, not with a theoretical alternative between Marxian socialism as practiced in Yugoslavia and some form of Western parliamentary democracy, but between Yugoslav influence and Soviet or Chinese influence. For, in certain areas such as the Bloc-oriented neutrals, the Yugoslav form of communism constitutes the only realistic, current alternative to a Soviet or Chinese orientation. In deciding whether a specific Yugoslav foreign program is advantageous to United States interests, the principal criterion should be the direction in which it leads the third country concerned. If Yugoslav influence were to turn a country like Indonesia - now strongly inclined toward the Soviet Union - toward Tito's brand of neutralism and revisionism, this would definitely be advantageous. If, on the other hand, Yugoslavia were to attempt to proselyte a country such as Greece, which already has a Western orientation, this - obviously - would run counter to United States interests.

Also to be considered, in assessing the relative merits and drawbacks of Yugoslav's influence in the developing areas, is the fact that Tito is in a unique position to speak from experience concerning the dangers of Soviet and Chinese hegemony. On balance Yugoslavia's activities in Afro-Asia are considered to be more favorable to the West than to the East.

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289. Khrushchev and the UNGA

Khrushchev's appearance before the 15th UNGA will obviously be a major propaganda show, for which much stage-setting has been done beginning with his wrecking of the Summit Conference and continuing throughout the summer. The unprecedented attendance of the leading figures of all European satellites points to a show intended to surpass that of last September, the impact of which may, in fact, have been overestimated by the Kremlin. A new and spectacular Soviet space accomplishment prior to or coincident with Khrushchev's arrival is possible.

Whatever the further buildup, we can assume it will be designed to enhance Khrushchev's two primary objectives:

- a. the continued indictment of the US and its present administration as both aggressive and dishonorable, as contrasted with the pacific and patient Soviet Union, and,
- b. the further restoration of the image of the CPSU as the authoritative voice of world communism in contradistinction to that of Communist China.

In speaking to his first (though probably not most important) objective, we should anticipate a review of the charges already made and incessantly repeated concerning aerial overflights (C-130, RB-47, and U-2) as well as repetition of the charges made by Mitchell and Martin. It may be expected that on this occasion the charges of US aggressive intent toward the Soviet Union will play a secondary role to an emphasis on alleged activity calculated to embarrass close allies of the United States and/or to impair relations between the US and other countries. Some material, whether true or false, is obviously already at hand from the "confessions" of Mitchell and Martin; other material can be presumed to be available to the Soviet government as a result of the information known to Powers but not brought into the open at his trial.

In pressing his second objective, Khrushchev will speak, over the heads of the assembled leaders of the satellite countries, to restate the correctness of the Soviet approach to general disarmament, detente, and peaceful coexistence. His intent will be calculated to re-affirm and, where necessary, reestablish, the peaceful image of the Soviet Union and of the Communist Movement led by the CPSU. Implicitly, he will be seeking to demonstrate, once more, this time in the broadest possible public forum rather than within closed party debate, that the CPSU's way is the monolithic, right way and that China is isolated so long as it diverges in its views.

We may expect new hints and gimmicks concerning disarmament which may be spelled out by Khrushchev or, more likely, left for later amplification by subordinates; he may produce specific proposals for a new Summit meeting next spring.

Of the other big four power leaders Mr. DeGaulle almost certainly will not attend the UNGA; there is no present indication that Mr. MacMillan will; and Mr. Eisenhower has not committed himself to do so, although he has indicated there are many factors which argue in favor of his doing so. As to meeting Khrushchev personally, Mr. Eisenhower has indicated that many conditions would first have to be met, of which only one was the release of the two RB-47 pilots still detained in the USSR.

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290. Khrushchev's Visit to North Korea

Speculation is now rampant that Khrushchev will announce a major proposal for the reunification or neutralization of Korea during his visit to Pyongyang in October. It is significant to note that all past proposals emanating from Pyongyang and other Communist capitals have consistently flouted Free World proposals for holding nation-wide elections under United Nations supervision. It is apparent that these Communist proposals were merely stalling tactics to provide time for them to attempt unification through penetration and subversion of the ROK Government. As demonstrated by the April 1960 overthrow of the Rhee regime and the formation of a democratic parliamentary form of government in South Korea, it is clear that Communist subversive techniques have failed and that their proposals have been flatly rejected by the ROK population. During the heat of the April revolution, there was not one known instance of pro-Communist activity manifested by the ROK demonstrators. It is also significant to note that since the overthrow of Rhee and the scrapping of his personal policy of reunification by force, the Communist capitals have virtually ignored commenting in depth on the Korean situation. Additionally, North Korean Premier Kim Il-song mysteriously dropped out of sight in June - supposedly because of an undescribed illness - and did not re-emerge until August, when he announced that Khrushchev would visit North Korea. Since all Communist maneuvering are calculated by design, it is likely that there is a significant connection between the virtual silence of the Communist press on the Korean situation, the weak explanation for the Kim Il-song disappearance, and the Khrushchev visit. Given the above, it is probable that to offset the prestige gained by the ROK since the April revolution and to divert attention from the establishment of a democratic parliamentary form of government in the ROK, a fresh Communist approach to the problem of reunification is in the offing.

A second major purpose of the visit is most probably related to the current massive efforts being made by Khrushchev to line-up support of Communist parties everywhere on his side in controversy between the Soviets and the Chicoms on the best tactics for ensuring Communist world domination. 25X1C10b

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